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Avoiding Regret in an Agent-Based Asset Pricing Model
Abstract
We use an agent-based asset pricing model to test the implications of the disposition effect (avoiding regret)
on investors’ interactions and price settings. We show that it has a direct impact on the returns series
produced by the model, altering important stylized facts such as its heavy tails and volatility clustering.
Moreover, we show that the horizon over which investors compute their wealth has no effect on the dynamics
produced by the model.
Keywords: agent-based model, asset pricing, disposition effect, behavioural bias
1. Introduction
One of the building blocks of modern financial theory relies on the belief that asset prices are determined by
the market interactions of utility maximising agents that form rational expectations about future outcomes.
This is the theoretical underpinning of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), which for a long time
has been used to explain the behaviour of asset prices. In a setting where all agents are fully rational,
they are assumed to follow the expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) for making
decisions under uncertainty.
However, this belief has been challenged over the years. Alternative theories describing how decision
makers behave under uncertainty have been proposed, leading to the development of prospect theory (Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). Some of its important implications are that, in reality, people deviate from
rationality and use biases or heuristics in decision making (Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Specifically, Shefrin
and Statman (1985) use prospect theory to show that investors may hold losing trades longer than profitable
ones – a now well-known phenomenon labelled as the disposition effect. Furthermore, evidence suggests that
investors’ unwillingness to cut their losses is closely related to the notion of regret, which may be accentuated
by having to admit their mistakes to other people (Kahneman et al., 1982). Put differently, investors may
not realise a loss because they are trying to avoid the regret associated with their initial (wrong) judgement.
Although behavioural biases have been clearly observed in real-life settings, examining their implications
on markets is still a challenging topic. For this reason, a considerable focus has shifted towards developing
models of human psychology as it relates to financial markets (Shiller, 2003). In particular, heterogeneous
agent-based models that rely on simple trading strategies have proven themselves very efficient in generating
important dynamics of real markets (Hommes, 2006). They attempt to explain these properties endoge-
nously, by considering the interaction of market participants. Moreover, a well-defined agent-based model
is an important tool for testing behavioural (Pruna et al., 2016) and economical theories (Chen, 2016) and
understanding their influence on the interplay between agents and prices.
To this end, we extend the well-known structural stochastic volatility model of Franke and Westerhoff
(2012) (FW) – one of the most successful in capturing empirically observed traders’ behaviour (Barde et al.,
2015). Specifically, we test, for the first time, the implications of the disposition effect on both agents’
interactions and the asset price dynamics. We find that while the time horizon over which investors consider
their wealth has no impact on the overall setting, the level of regret directly impacts the returns series
produced by the model, altering its stylized facts and leading to disruptive behaviour.
2. Model definition
First, we describe the FW model, which we then extend to capture the disposition effect in agents’ behaviour.
Here, the asset price changes are determined by excess demand, following the interaction of two types of
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agents: fundamentalists and chartists. By excess demand we mean the precise positive or negative orders
per trading period. Fundamentalists believe in the price reversal towards its perceived fundamental value
and have a demand function, dft , proportional to the gap p
f
t − pt, where pt and pft are the asset’s log price
and fundamental log value at time t, respectively. We depart from the original FW setting and assume the
fundamental price follows a geometric Brownian motion, as this modification was shown to overcome the
stationary dynamics of price series generated by the model (Pruna et al., 2016). In contrast, chartists are
simple trend followers whose demand is proportional to the latest price change. Thus, the net demand of
each group for the asset in period t is given by:
dft = φ(p
f
t − pt) + ft , ft ∼ N (0, σ2f ), φ > 0, f > 0, (1)
dct = χ(pt − pt−1) + ct , ct ∼ N (0, σ2c ), χ ≥ 0, c ≥ 0, (2)
where φ and χ are constants denoting the aggressiveness of the traders’ demand and σft and σ
c
t are noise
variances meant to capture the wide variety of within-group specifications.
The agents can switch between strategies at each iteration, with their market fractions (nft and n
c
t)
fluctuating over time. The total (scaled) demand given by Dt = n
f
t d
f
t + n
c
td
c
t will generally not add up to
zero and we will have an excess of either supply or demand. A market maker is assumed to mediate the
transactions between investors and provide liquidity. Specifically, the market maker reacts to the imbalance
between demand and supply by proportionally adjusting the price with a constant factor µ > 0. Accordingly,
the equation determining the price for the next period t+ 1 is given by:
pt+1 = pt +
µ
2
(nft d
f
t + n
c
td
c
t) + t, t ∼ N (0, σ2t ), (3)
where the combined time-varying variance σt depends on the changes in the market fractions of the funda-
mentalists and chartists.
For completeness, it is necessary to set up the motions of market fractions, determined by a transition
probabilities approach (Lux, 1995). Its basic idea is that agents switch strategies with certain probabilities,
relying on the exponential of a switching index, at, such that:
P cft = ν exp(at)
P fct = ν exp(−at),
(4)
where P cft , P
fc
t are the probabilities of shifting from chartist to fundamentalist at time t and vice-versa,
respectively. The parameter at is determined by several factors including a predisposition towards one of
the two types, a herding factor and a price misalignment between pt and p
f
t . These three elements combined
form the attractiveness level, formally defined as:
at = α0 + αn(n
f
t − nct) + αp(pt − pft )2, (5)
where α0 is the predisposition parameter, αn captures the herding parameter and αp measures the influence
of price misalignment.
Now, since the FW model has been shown to recreate an extensive list of statistical properties of real-life
financial markets, we choose it to test the implications of investors’ unwillingness to cut their losses.
In their seminal paper, Kahneman et al. (1982) argue that people think in terms of changes in their
wealth, being concerned about its fluctuations. After a loss in the stock market, an investor may experience
a sense of regret over his decision of using a particular strategy (Wong, 2015). He may interpret his loss as
a sign that his thinking is flawed and he may feel disappointment if word leaks out (Barberis et al., 2001).
Therefore, to avoid the regret associated with his judgement being wrong, he has a disposition to stick with
his strategy for a longer period of time.
To incorporate this behavioural bias in our agent-based model, we need to formally define the notion of
a loss. In more detail, with respect to strategy s = f, c, let gst be the short term capital gains that an agent
of this type realises at time t:
gst = [exp(pt)− exp(pt−1)]dst−2, (6)
2
and let
wst = ηw
s
t−1 + (1− η)gst , (7)
be the profit earned by an agent that follows strategy s, discounted by a memory coefficient η < 1.
Some of the agents are assumed to be biased towards retaining losing positions in order to avoid the
regret of being wrong 1. As a result, whenever they find themselves in a losing strategy they do not realise
the loss and stick to that strategy hoping that their bad luck will soon reverse. Formally, the probability of
the biased agents switching types decreases when they are losing money:
ˆ
P cft = P
cf
t − λP cft , if wct < 0,
ˆ
P fct = P
fc
t − λP fct , if wft < 0,
(8)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] measures the agents’ unwillingness to cut their losses, avoiding regret. We can view λ as
the percentage of biased investors within the population.
A further important concept in prospect theory is the horizon over which gains and losses are measured
– in other words, how often an agent evaluates his investment performance. In our model, this is specified
by the memory parameter η ∈ [0, 1), which indicates how much weight an agent puts on his latest profits
and how much on his past wealth, when computing his current, accumulated wealth. Simply put, η relates
to the look-back window used by an agent when calculating his wealth, with the time horizon increasing
with η. Since the disposition effect is associated with the investors’ tendency of ignoring past mistakes and
putting them in a larger perspective, the memory parameter should play a role in how this bias affects the
agents.
Note that the attractiveness level and the two parameters η and λ are all independent of each other.
In the original FW setting, the market fractions are determined by the transition probability approach,
depending only on at. However, in order to capture the agents’ unwillingness to cut their losses, our
extended version of the model introduces two new parameters, η and λ. Furthermore, since our aim is to
test the implications of the behavioural bias on agents’ interactions and returns settings, we will mainly
focus on these two parameters.
Clearly, both η and λ have an impact on the market interactions, independent of at. On one hand, η
puts into larger perspective the latest realized loss when calculating the current level of wealth. The larger
the realised loss gst , the larger its impact on the accumulated wealth when multiplied by 1− η and thus the
less likelihood of switching strategies. On the other hand, the impact of λ directly follows from Equation 8.
As λ increases, agents become biased and the likelihood of switching strategies decreases. Finally, for large
values of λ, as the percentage of biased agents increases, it dominates the switching mechanism.
3. Impact of the disposition effect
To assess the implications of investors’ unwillingness to realise their losses, we vary both the regret λ ∈ [0, 1]
and the memory η ∈ [0, 1) parameters, considering 100 equally spaced values for each parameter. We fix all
the other parameters to their values reported by Franke and Westerhoff (2012), where they were estimated
using the method of simulated moments on observed S&P500 data. Interestingly, Figures 1 (a) and (b)
shows that the agents’ market fractions are not notably affected by either λ or η, having a median value of
nf ≈ 0.93. This is due to the stochastic behaviour of prices leading to the wealth changing from positive to
negative values. Therefore, the changes in the transition probabilities balance out and market proportions
don’t change much, with both fundamentalist and chartists surviving the competition, as we usually see in
these settings.
We now turn our attention to the implications of memory and regret on the returns series produced by
our behavioural model. The returns themselves are specified in percentage points, so with respect to the
1Here we investigate only one aspect of the disposition effect, namely, holding onto the losing position. The other tendency
of selling the winners too soon is not incorporated in our model.
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Figure 1: Impact of the disposition effect on agents’ interactions and returns.
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log prices pt, we may write rt = 100 ∗ (pt − pt−1). In Figures 1 (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) we plot the
returns’ excess kurtosis, its Hill tail index and the autocorrelation of absolute returns for different levels of
λ and η. We observe that the memory parameter doesn’t affect the returns at all. This leads to the counter
intuitive finding that the horizon over which wealth is measured doesn’t change the agents’ interactions or
the model’s dynamics. Therefore, the investors’ unwillingness to cut their losses has the same effect on the
overall dynamics irrespective of how often they evaluate their performance.
On the other hand, the regret parameter has a direct impact on the properties of returns. As λ increases,
its excess kurtosis drops 40% from 1.00 to 0.60, while the Hill tail index grows 11% from 4.50 to 5.00. This
means the peakiness of returns and its tail heaviness decrease as the agents become more biased, leading to
a flatter and more normal distribution of returns. In other words, we observe a decrease in the heavy tails
of returns. Moreover, Figures 1 (g) and (h) show how the first autocorrelation of absolute returns decreases
42% from 0.93 to 0.54 as we increase λ. This is a clear sign of decline in volatility clustering.
Therefore, an increase in the disposition effect leads to violations of some of the most discussed stylized
facts of financial data 2. Note that the outbursts in volatility appear as a consequence of chartism dominance
periods. Accordingly, in a setting where pt deviates from p
f
t , the fundamentalists lose money and their
bias lowers the probability of shifting to chartism. Moreover, if the price follows the trend, the chartists
make profit and their probability of switching to fundamentalism is not affected by the disposition effect.
Accordingly, the fundamentalists’ market fraction stays high, with less outburst of chartism and volatility
clustering. Overall, investors unwillingness to cut their losses has a significant impact on the time series
produced by our model.
4. Conclusions
Our work leads to two important findings. On the one hand, we show that the horizon over which the
agents consider alternative scenarios, an important concept of prospect theory, has no impact on the setting
dynamics. This is surprising because in prospect theory it does have a decisive role in agents’ interactions.
On the other hand, the level of regret directly impacts the returns series produced by the model, altering
its stylized facts and leading to disruptive behaviour. Specifically, we demonstrate how these disruptions can
appear and show that the disposition effect has a direct impact on the returns’ distribution, its heavy tails
and volatility clustering. This provides support for the behavioural finance literature arguing that investors
systematic biases can lead to unexpected market behaviour, with deviations from efficiency and rationality.
For future work, we will use the model to investigate the impact of the other side of the disposition effect
(selling winners too soon) and other behavioural factors such as gossip or waves of optimism and pessimism
on the system’s dynamics.
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